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Neuroethics:  
The Ethics and History Behind Deep Brain Stimulation 
 
Abstract 
In this Project we have tried to answer the Question: What is the history leading 
up to the development of Deep Brain Stimulation, and what are the ethical 
implications to the ethics of neuroscience? Has the historical background of 
psychosurgery affected the ethical climate now in regards to Deep Brain 
Stimulation, and are there any challenges to Deep Brain Stimulation’s future? 
We have gone through the historical background leading up to the use of Deep 
Brain Stimulation, and we discuss how the historical background of 
psychosurgery might have hindered recent treatments like Deep Brain 
Stimulation. We have looked into the ethical issues surrounding Deep Brain 
Stimulation and neuroethics in general, and we discuss if Deep Brain Stimulation 
should be used. 
 
 
Summary 
I dette Projekt har vi forsøgt at svarer, What is the history leading up to the 
development of Deep Brain Stimulation, and what are the ethical implications to 
the ethics of neuroscience? Has the historical background of psychosurgery 
affected the ethical climate now in regards to Deep Brain Stimulation, and are 
there any challenges to Deep Brain Stimulation’s future? Vi har gennemgået de 
historiske behandlinger som leder op til begyndelsen af Deep Brain Stimulation. 
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Vi har belyst hvordan behandlinger som “det hvide snit” og specielt den 
lemfældige praksis som omgav sådan en behandling har været medvirkende til 
at hjernekirurgi som et hele har fået et dårligt ry som ikke nødvendigvis er 
retfærdig.  I modsætning til behandlinger som “det hvide snit” som ødelægger 
hjernevæv i et specielt område, fungerer Deep Brain Stimulation ved at en 
elektrode indføres i hjernen denne elektrode stimulerer de nærliggende 
områder af hjernen hvilket kan dæmpe symptomer på sygdomme som fx. 
Parkinsons og Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Samtidig med at Deep 
Brain Stimulation kan afhjælpe symptomer på alvorlige sygdomme åbner en 
sådan behandling også op for en række etiske problematikker i såvel 
hjernevidenskab og sygdomsbehandling generelt men også nogle etiske 
dilemmaer mere specifikt til Deep Brain stimulation. Vi har i denne rapport 
belyst og diskuteret disse etiske problemer. Vi konkluderer at selvom Deep Brain 
Stimulation berøres af udfordringer som patienters informeret samtykke og tvivl 
om både behandlingens effektivitet og bivirkninger, er behandlingen forsvarlig i 
så vidt at den, indtil der er mere sikker information om Deep Brain stimulations 
success, kun bliver brugt som en sidste løsning i situationer hvor andre bedre 
kendte behandlinger ikke har vist sig tilstrækkelige. 
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 Introduction: 
 
Neuroethics studies the normative ethical application of neuroscience. To 
paraphrase Adina Roskies: neuroethics is about the ‘ethics of neuroscience, and 
the neuroscience of ethics.’  To clarify in more detail, neuroethics is about 
applying ethics to the research and practise of neuroscience, and using 
neuroscience to better understand how we use ethics through knowledge about 
the brain. For the purpose of this project we will be more concerned with the 
ethics of neuroscience (Glannon, Walter, 2007-13). 
 
The applications for neuroscience and neuroethics--due to them being 
intermingled and reliant upon each other--has a broad an application as we can 
perceive. This  is a lot of potential application, even if we were to narrow the 
scope of what we could apply it to down to at least those things we consider 
‘ethical’. Assuming we did, any situation that requires a moral decision to be 
made--even  those that seem to be obvious--requires a reliance upon our brain, 
due to it being responsible for our consciousness. As such, the mingled nature to 
neuroscience and neuroethics means that there are no shortage of examples to 
look at when considering neuroethics. The dilemmas around Deep Brain 
Stimulation (DBS) and its future, for one. 
 
In this project we have decided to examine the history leading up to DBS, types 
and uses for DBS, and the ethical issues now surrounding it. We will pay 
4 
attention to and recognize some of the more nuanced ethical dilemmas and 
factors of using neuroethics: medical ethics, figures relating to DBS, issues for 
DBS in the future, and stigmas it has to contend with in regards to 
psychosurgery’s past. 
 
We will be talking about distinction between invasive and non-invasive 
treatments, the history both have come to be, their relation to each other, and 
how we have come to have DBS from them. To give a basic understanding now, 
DBS is the process wherein a neurosurgeon or other suitably qualified 
professional inserts electrodes into the brain to directly stimulate certain areas 
for certain effects. This would be done in the most dire circumstances, and it is 
in cases like these where figures are gathered from, and as such we get our 
figures from those studies. Regardless, it is the case that the person in question 
would have no other option but to turn to such drastic measures as a last resort 
to treat their illness. 
 
But, should they be used as a last resort? If a treatment like DBS is shown to be 
effective, should it be a last resort when it can have a noticeable, quantifiable, 
and positive effect in the  improvement to patient health? Is it that we would 
rather keep a negative attitude than explore new treatments? Is it in the history 
of invasive treatments leading up to DBS that has given this attitude? 
 
To begin, we will give a brief outline of what neuroscientific and neurosurgical 
advancements have occurred within the past century or so. This will enlighten 
the topic and give a foundational background, leading into what it is that the 
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crux of our argument will focus around: deep brain stimulation. This background 
knowledge will provide context for the argument and allow further points to be 
understood with clarity and coherence.  After which we will tackle some of the 
ethical issues surrounding medical treatment in general--since treatment of the 
brain falls under that--which we will then lead into the neuroethics surrounding 
DBS, drawing into a discussion involving content from throughout the essay. 
 
 
Lobotomy and Leucotomy: 
 
To begin, we will start with lobotomy and leucotomy, which were perhaps the 
most infamous invasive procedures of the 20th century. Nowadays pop culture 
tends to have a negative view of lobotomy in particular, with films such as One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and Shutter Island painting it as a questionable 
procedure at best. But, arguably it has been unjustly ruled as an intentionally 
malicious procedure in its nature. Whilst some examples show a blatant 
disregard for patient care--which leads one to believe those carrying it out had 
in some cases less than noble intentions-- the procedure itself was derived from 
at least a basic desire to help treat illness. The concept of psychosurgeries such 
as lobotomy and leucotomy is not even something of the 20th century, more the 
19th, and perhaps even the origins of psychosurgery, certainly brain surgery 
itself go back so far back that it may be not traceable in history. Both lobotomy 
and leucotomy involve cutting and manipulating the brain in the attempt to 
alleviate serious mental illness. 
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 Traceable and relatively  modern attempts to use it to try to treat patients with 
mental illness can be seen emerging from the 19th century, starting with 
Friedrich Goltz (Science Blogs, 24.7.2007). He was German physiologist who 
surgically operated on the neocortex of dogs and noted their behavioural 
changes, not to be confused to Pavlov who trained dogs to salivate on command 
through conditioning. These findings pathed the way for a Swiss physician 
named Gottlieb Burckhardt, the director of a small asylum in Switzerland, to use 
ablations on the frontal cortex of six patients in 1890 in an attempt to cure their 
schizophrenia. It did not have favourable results by any standard, and one of the 
patients committed suicide, another died two weeks later, but three showed 
improvement--a stunning failure in the sense that there is a massive range of 
outcomes, but a triumph in the sense that it actually showed that improvement 
could be made through the use of psychosurgery. However, at the time Gottlieb 
Burckhardt’s colleagues denounced his technique, and one can only assume that 
the remaining patient that did not die, or show improvement, remained in a 
mentally ill state; most likely the patient’s case worsened, since it was not 
counted amongst those who showed improvement.  
 
After Gottlieb Burckhardt, the procedure was not again performed on humans 
until the 1930’s, where perhaps the  first ‘lobotomy’ was carried out in Portugal 
by a neurologist named Antonio Egas Moniz in 1935 (Tartakovsky, M., 2011). He 
called it a ‘leucotomy’, and it involved drilling holes into the patient’s skull to 
access the brain, and for this he earned the Nobel Prize in Medicine. The 
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leucotomy is, for all intensive purposes, the same as a lobotomy insofar that it 
involves making incisions, or in some way cutting or scraping the prefrontal lobe 
of the brain in an effort to treat severe psychiatric conditions and psychosis.  
 
One year later a man by the name of Walter Freeman, and his partner James 
Watts, both Americans, performed the first ‘lobotomy’, as Freeman re-named 
the procedure, perhaps in an attempt to ‘brand’ it. It is him that can be 
attributed for the animosity that people in the present say have towards the 
procedure of lobotomy. It is also Freeman that created the ‘ice pick’ method of 
inserting a sharp instrument above the eyeball, into the socket, to access the 
brain in which to scrape away at brain tissue (Boeree, George). In can be 
inferred that Freeman had liked the results brought about by operating on the 
prefrontal cortex, which is why he mirrored Moniz’s technique. However, unlike 
Moniz, Freeman opted and created a technique of surgery that relied less upon 
precision, and more upon approximation. This technique that switched clinical 
precision for speed and cost effectiveness, involved the pick moving around and 
tearing away tissue within the approximate area of the brain around the 
prefrontal lobe behind the eye socket. He went on to perform approximately 
2500 lobotomies, attempting to break lobotomy time records, prescribing 
lobotomy for not only psychosis and severe depression--like before--but also 
criminality. Accounts claim that he would make lines of patients, and attempt to 
‘treat’ them as quick as possible with his gold-plated ice pick--something that 
even his contemporaries thought was abhorrent, let alone people now. Reports 
say the scene would make experienced surgeons feint at the sight, and that even 
his old partner Watts commented that he had gone too far with his 
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showmanship. His love for  showmanship and ego in his lobotomies are what 
arguably had  the most distinct impression on the fall of the use of the lobotomy 
leading into the 1950’s, with public approval for the procedure plummeting, and 
even the USSR banning the use of lobotomies on ‘ethical grounds’.  
 
 
Leading into the Future: 
 
So what followed for invasive brain surgery in the horrific scene of discontent 
left in Freeman’s wake? The answer is finer, delicate, better understood invasive 
procedures that follow more in the Monizian tradition of the leucotomy, 
procedures that better respect the brain’s complexity and its importance for us 
to function. In addition, what follows is the introduction of pharmaceuticals and 
‘non-invasive’ techniques in attempt to manipulate the brain without cutting 
into it. Such techniques were far better received, and still very much are better 
thought of today. For example, how many people nowadays think twice about 
taking drugs for depression or Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD)? Danish 
Health Insurance organization Danmark Sygeforsikring reports that 110,000 
Danes are living with moderate to severe depression, which arguably would 
imply that they have been diagnosed to be classified, and are likely receiving 
some sort of treatment (Kaas, Karin). Because of their success and popular usage 
and reception, a lot of the advancements in invasive psychosurgery in their wake 
often use noninvasive techniques in tandem with invasive psychosurgery to try 
to achieve maximum effectiveness when treating the patient. It is this, along 
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with more sophisticated ablative techniques that not only see a maximization in 
effectiveness, but also, and perhaps more importantly, reducing the risk 
associated with the procedures in the past: something that is key for public and 
academic consensus and acceptance. 
 
 
Noninvasive Treatments: 
 
Noninvasive procedures are procedures that do not break the skin or enter a 
body cavity. These types of procedures became favoured after the run of 
lobotomy and leucotomy, especially in the USA. Techniques such as Electro 
Conductive Therapy (ECT)--previously known as Electroshock Therapy--wherein 
seizures are induced in the effort of relieving severe psychiatric illnesses were 
used before the introduction of effective medication to treat those illnesses. 
Amusingly it is considered a noninvasive technique, despite the individual being 
put under general anaesthetic and potentially having an IV to administer said 
anesthetic; so arguably in that instance invasive procedure via proxy. 
Furthermore, since 1938, there has been improvement of technique and result, 
with two stemming treatments--one invasive (Vagus Nerve Stimulation) and one 
not (Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation)--branching off from the 
procedure of ECT (Nation Institute of Mental Health). However, whilst only 
recently things have started to change to Deep Brain Stimulation as a viable 
alternative in the 1990’s, all three previous methods are FDA approved in the 
USA (Bronstein, Jeff M., et al. ) (National Institute of Mental Health). This 
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improvement, along with the introduction of the antipsychotic Chlorpromazine, 
amongst other drugs used to treat illnesses psychosis and mental health, marks 
the end of lobotomy and leucotomy, undermining of future ablative surgery to 
treat psychiatric illness. This is due to the fact that these treatments--especially 
pharmaceuticals--are outrunning and achieving better, less risky, mostly 
reversible, and more cost efficient ways to treat patients when compared to 
their invasive counterparts before DBS (Ban, Thomas A. 2007). 
 
 
Techniques of Ablative Surgery: 
 
Regardless of the ablative surgeries in later part of the 20th century not having 
preference, and DBS beginning to replacing it now, in this segment some 
clarification into what the ablative techniques developed were, as to give some 
better context into the timeline of advancement preceding into DBS (Wichman, 
Thomas, et al. 2006). The ablative techniques revolved around the destruction 
of brain tissue through more precise and less traumatic methods than the ice 
pick method; this would render problematic areas inert without removing them, 
essentially resulting in the same effect as if they were removed. Called Ablative 
Brain Surgery (or Brain Lesioning), it involved two types of lesions: Excitotoxic 
Lesions, and Radio Frequency Lesions. The former involved the injection of 
amino acids to essentially stimulate the selected area of neurons (area of the 
brain) to death. One crucial benefit of this is that the chemicals can be selected 
on the basis that they only react with the selected neurons. They only react with 
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a certain part of the brain, and not the surrounding areas through the 
unintentional damaging of the axons (the ‘bridge’ between neurons) that 
connect to and enable the main body of the neuron to communicate with others 
through electrical pulses, which means it should not damage more than the part 
of the brain than was intended (Carlson, Neil R., 1997-132-133). The latter 
involved putting electrodes into the brain that emit an extremely high 
alternating current that produces heat that destroys the surrounding brain 
tissue. Despite the relative accuracy of these treatments, they are rare today 
due to  their non reversible nature (Carlson, Neil R., 1997-132) 
 
 
What Enabled DBS to Exist?: 
 
Advancements in the method of treatment, methods of diagnosis are also more 
apt, which potentially enables us to not destroy brain tissue. Which is why only 
late into the 20th century--around 1990--has DBS really start to become a viable 
alternative to treat illnesses like Parkinson's. Brain scanning and imaging 
techniques now allow for a better understanding of how the brain works 
through how it responds to certain stimuli in animals and humans (Szczepanski, 
Sara M., et al. 2014). It impacts what unreleased, drugs being developed do to 
the brain when used, and how different people, sexes, ages, and other 
background conditions affect the reaction they have. In addition, brain scans 
help show how the brains of people who have been through brain trauma react 
to to injury, compared to how it functions normally, so that scientists can 
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discern what it is in the brain that is most important for what function, or illness 
of a person. The way they do this is by observing the damaged tissue, and 
compare their behaviour and brain function to that of a healthy person. This is 
key when attempting to understanding how to treat something through either 
non-invasive or invasive forms of treatment. 
 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation: 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation is one of, if not the most recent iterations of invasive 
treatment in the effort to fight severe mental illnesses, conditions, and some 
forms of motor movement difficulties (Wichman, Thomas, et al. 2006). Unlike 
previous surgical and ablative procedures beforehand, Deep Brain Stimulation is 
reversible; as it relies upon the stimulation of certain areas to achieve a working, 
healthy function. This can be scaled back throughout the course of the 
treatment by a trained professional, or even stopped. Because of this, there is 
certainly less risk when taking into consideration the finality irreversible nature 
of previous, ablative treatments. It also means that it can be used at earlier 
stages, whilst invasive procedures beforehand tended to be used in the most 
extreme and last resort cases--that is assuming they were proscribed 
responsibly. The ethics and applicability of such a use will be discussed later in 
the essay, as to not form a tangent from the narrative. However, with the 
reduction and even erasing of some downsides, like the irreversible nature of 
ablative surgery which demand it be used as a last resort, it does beg the 
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question as to why it should not be used before a last resort if the patient could 
benefit from it. 
 
There are four main types of Deep Brain Stimulation: Subthalamic DBS, Globus 
pallidus DBS, Thalamic DBS, and Pedunculopontine nucleus DBS. These target 
different areas of the brain for different treatments, illnesses, and diseases. 
What type of DBS is used for what illness will be elaborated upon as they are 
addressed, but most are typically used for Parkinson’s and gait (UW Health, 
Neurosurgery). Having Deep Brain Stimulation performed as a treatment is 
much like having a pacemaker implanted into one’s chest, since it involves 
having something implanted into someone to mediate proper function 
artificially. DBS is removable and adjustable with relative ease. The electrodes 
are inserted into the relevant areas of the brain under local anesthetic, after the 
surgeon tests the functionality of the device, the patient is put under general 
anaesthetic and the wires are placed under the skin, lead down behind the ear, 
where they end at a battery and controlling device that is kept under the skin 
around one’s stomach or chest area (Parkinson's UK, Deep Brain Stimulation). 
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 Above are the figures that show the complications of DBS in non-psychological terms, as reported in the Clausen 
Article (Clausen, Jens 2010, pg. 1153). These figures will be elaborated upon in the discussion. 
  
 
Deep Brain Stimulation for Parkinson's: 
 
Parkinson's is where most of the statistics for DBS (including the tables above 
and below) come from. This is due to it being a now fairly established treatment 
for Parkinson's in medical circles; albeit as a last resort. There are a few focuses 
for treatment, but in regards to tremors and motor function, an article reported 
that stimulation of the ventral intermediate nucleus of the thalamus reduced 
significantly the tremor associated and caused by Parkinson’s Disease (PD) (Wu 
Tao, et al. 2012). In addition stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus or the 
internal segment of the globus pallidus can also substantially reduce 
bradykinesia, rigidity, tremor, and gait difficulties in people with Parkinson's 
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(Perlmutter, Joel S. et al., 2006). With results like these for Parkinson's, it has 
inspired optimism that DBS can be used for other conditions like Tourettes, 
dystonia, depression, and ODC to name a few (Wichman, Thomas, et al. 2006), 
(Perlmutter, Joel S. et al., 2006). It must be recognized, though, that the  hopes 
to treat psychiatric illnesses is preliminary. The main focus of DBS at the 
moment, where it has seen the most usage, and where the studies into the 
effectiveness and side-effects mostly come from, is in regards to those areas of 
the brain that are stimulated in an attempt to remedy Parkinson's disease. It is 
also worth noting that most of the side effects reported are in relation to said 
treatments, since the vast majority of DBS treatments are prescribed for 
Parkinson's disease. 
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 Above is a table including the psychological side effects of DBS in patients experiencing Parkinson’s Disease. The 
figures shown are Parkinson’s cases by a vast majority, this table is from and according to the Clausen report 
(Clausen, Jens 2010, pg. 1153) 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation for Dystonia: 
 
Stereotaxic ablative surgery of the the globus pallidus or thalamus (thalamus 
being a region of the brain that DPS has had relative success with in regards to 
PD) has traditionally been used to treat dystonia, with varying and limited 
success. With the rise of DBS however, the temptation to use it to treat dystonia 
is obvious considering the seemingly similar symptoms and the issue regarding 
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the degradation of bodily movement and control. Both globus pallidus and 
thalamus proved relevant to the treatment, however, throughout the course of 
using it, it was found that focusing upon the globus pallidus was more effective. 
A study involving 22 patients with primary generalized dystonia showed a 
30-50% improvement when given DBS to treat their condition (Perlmutter, Joel 
S. et al., 2006). The 30-50% figure is under the assumption that there were no 
side effects or that the other patients in the study did not experience negative 
effects, since no negativity was mentioned in the account (ibid.). Taking this into 
account, like Parkinson's, the use of DBS shows promise, given the evidence, and 
predictions of those with expertise in the field (Wichman, Thomas, et al. 2006). 
 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation for Tourettes: 
 
Tourettes is a disorder that involves the individual having physical, and at least 
one vocal tic, that are unintentional. Information regarding Tourettes is 
inconclusive, and there has been only six cases of published data where DBS has 
been used in an attempt to treat the condition. All of those six did report a 
reduction in their tics, however, six people is not enough data to make a 
conclusive or even a broad judgement of the effectiveness of the treatment 
(Perlmutter, Joel S. et al., 2006). Neither can it be concluded that it is worth the 
risk, since the amount of the reduction of said tics is not reported in the sources 
referenced, and no sources were found to state otherwise. There is a possibility 
that there is data showing the amount of reduction in tics, but they could not be 
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accessed due to financial limitations. Because of this, the only conclusion of DBS 
in regards to Tourettes is that is ‘of interest’ in regards to future treatment. It is 
worth mentioning that the two regions of the brain used within those 
aforementioned six cases were the centromedian-parafascicular complex of the 
thalamus (the thalamus also being targeted for Parkinson’s and dystonia), and 
the anterior limb of the internal capsule.  
 
 
 
 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation for Depression: 
 
Figures for depression suffers from a similar difficulty to Tourettes: there is a 
lack of available subjects to try it on. Those subjects who would be put through 
DBS would be those that are resistant to other treatments, it would be as a last 
resort, and there are limited published cases to take figures from in which to 
draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the treatment.  For depression, the 
white matter of the subgenual cingulate was targeted in a study mentioned in 
the Perlmutter and Mink report (Perlmutter, Joel S. et al., 2006). In that case 
four out of the six tested reported an improvement in mood. In that instance, at 
least, the targeted area of the brain is a notable change from other issues that 
DBS is being used to treat, as it is positioned slightly away from the other areas 
of the brain that DBS targets for the other aforementioned illnesses. Overall, 
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including said study, only very few cases of DBs for depression have been 
recorded. Both the 2006 Perlmutter and Mink report, and later, the 2010 
Clausen report  published findings on the usage of DBS for depression (Clausen, 
Jens 2010). The Perlmutter and Mink report published that are were ten cases of 
treatment of DBS for those with depression. This is nowhere near enough to 
form a conclusion on the effectiveness of the treatment, or enough information 
to narrow down where and how in the brain we can better treat using DBS. Even 
if one were to assume that more cases have been published since 2006, it would 
very likely not overshadow the numbers for Parkinson's, and even in the case of 
Parkinson's there is still debate as to how, or whether, DBS should be 
performed. 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder: 
 
Similarly to depression, with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) there were 
very few cases conducted in the Perlmutter and Mink report for OCD. There 
were a sum of eight that were reported in the 2006 Perlmutter and Mink report, 
and of those, six reported improvement (Perlmutter, Joel S. et al., 2006). 
Because of these low figures, it means that any ethical speculations in the future 
in regards to DBS with depression and OCD are purely inductive hypotheses. 
They are based upon the notion that medical treatments tend to improve over 
time. Reports now tend to show that over 50% of patients show improvement, 
and it is worth noting that those patients who experience DBS in these instances 
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are, and have been, resistant to other treatments and pharmaceuticals in the 
past.  
Bioethics 
 
In this chapter we will outline the central ethical principles of modern bioethics. 
One of the seminal works in bioethics is what’s called the 1979 Belmont report. 
The Belmont Report starts out by outlining the difference between practice and 
research. This difference is important since the ethical implications can in some 
instances differ significantly. These are not concepts that are always kept 
separate, nor are they always easily distinguished and often they go 
hand-in-hand. One example of this is when research is carried out to evaluate 
the efficacy and safety of a treatment. The question then is what is the 
difference between practice and research? The term practice usually refers to 
interventions made in order to enhance the well-being of a patient, these 
interventions are interventions that have a reasonable expectation of success, 
practice aims to treat, provide preventive treatment or diagnose the patients. 
The term research refers to the testing of an hypothesis, the aim of the research 
is to develop treatments, and gather knowledge about a certain area. Research 
tends to be experimental in nature, and research programs tend to have clear 
description of the objective in mind, as well as a clear way to achieve said 
objective. Typically laws command that any research should undergo review to 
ensure the protection of human subjects. 
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 The Belmont Report outlines three basic moral principles which are particularly 
important to bioethics: 
 
1. Respect for Persons 
 
The first basic moral principle, ‘Respect for Persons’--sometimes also referred to 
as autonomy--presumes that people are autonomous agents, that individuals 
are “capable of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the 
deliberation of such goals” (US Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Belmont Report, 1979) . In cases where an individual might have a diminished 
autonomy, the individual is entitled to protection. Respect for the autonomous 
person means that a person’s considered opinions and choices are given 
intrinsic value as long as they are not clearly harmful to others.  
Not showing respect for persons is to deny an autonomous person a say in their 
own freedom, to act according to their considered opinions, or to withhold 
information relevant for a person’s ability to have considered opinions, 
especially when there is no compelling reason to do so.  
There might however be situations where a person is not capable of making 
these considered opinions. This ability to form considered opinions is something 
we develop throughout life, though in some cases such as illness, mental 
disability or circumstances that severely restrict liberty, one might not qualify as 
an autonomous person. Here, respect for persons means that some may require 
protection while they mature or while they are incapacitated. The extent of 
protection one is afforded should depend upon the risk of harm and the 
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likelihood of benefit. This protection ranges from extensive protection to little 
protection beyond making sure that the person who freely undertake activities 
is aware of and understand the possible adverse consequences. The judgment of 
whether or not an individual lacks autonomy should be reevaluated periodically 
(US Department of Health and Human Services, the Belmont Report, 1979).  
 
2. Beneficence 
 
The second basic moral principle is called beneficence. This moral principle 
dictates that in order for any person to be treated ethically, the treatment 
should try to ensure the patients well-being. The term beneficence is 
understood as an obligation. The Belmont report specifies two general rules of 
beneficent actions: one, do not harm, and two, to maximize possible benefits 
and minimize possible harms. Claude Bernard further extended this into 
research, stating that one should not injure one person regardless of the 
benefits that might come to others. The Belmont report then goes on to state 
that in order to know what cause harm one might expose persons to unforeseen 
risk of harm. The problem is then to decide when it is justifiable to accept some 
risk of harm in order to seek certain benefits, and whether research that might 
be to minimal risk of child but to great benefit of another can be considered 
ethical (US Department of Health and Human Services, the Belmont Report, 
1979).  
 
3. Justice 
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The third basic moral principle is justice, here the question is one fairness in 
distribution, who benefits and, who ought to benefit. The principle of justice is 
to ensure that no one is denied benefits they are entitled to without good 
reason, or when some burden is imposed on a person for no good reason. 
“Equals ought to be treated equally”(US Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Belmont Report, 1979) this does not mean that everyone is entitled 
to the same treatment since, as the report pointed out different factors are 
commonly accepted as distinctions between people, one such distinction is age. 
The Belmont report sets up 5 formulations on how burdens and benefits should 
be distributed: one, to each person an equal share; two, to each person 
according to individual need; three, to each person according to individual 
effort; four, to each person according to societal contribution; five, to each 
person according to merit (US Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Belmont Report, 1979). 
 
 
In setting out these three basic moral principles the Belmont report has by and 
large set up a foundation for modern bioethics. In addition to these three moral 
principles, more are regularly added. Namely, the principle of human dignity and 
the sanctity of human life. Non-maleficence (do no harm) is also considered by 
some to be a part of the principle of beneficence. The question of human dignity 
brings up a range of new questions regarding culture, and whether someone is 
treated with dignity. The human body is a part if not the entirety of a person, 
and it constitutes our human dignity, integrity and vulnerability. Consequently, 
the dignity of the human body has intrinsic value, however, at the same time 
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there is also a constructive element in that a person creates their “self” on the 
basis of the body (Rendtorff, D, Jacob & Kemp, Peter, 2000). 
It is easy to see why bioethics relates to Neuroethics because diseases of the 
brain are treated in the same sense as any other medical condition. However, 
aside from considering whether a treatment or research shows respect to 
persons, beneficence, or justice, neuroethics gives rise to another consideration. 
This leads some moral principles, such as respect to persons,  to become further 
complicated. Take the discussion of whether a patient is an autonomous person, 
this is obviously more relevant than ever when treating people with mental 
illness. the same extra complication can be added to the discussion of 
beneficence, and lot of the time one cannot easily determine if an outcome is 
entirely successful. It was previously mentioned that there was an extra 
condition to Neuroethics, a conditions that you do not, or at least in a very 
different way, run into when dealing with treatment that does not directly affect 
the brain. Neuroethics certainly overlaps with bioethics in many areas. But the 
tight connection between the brain and behavior and the brain and the self, 
adds something extra to be considered when dealing with Neuroethics.  
 
 
Neuroethics: 
 
In this chapter we will explain some of the basic issues in neuroethics. The rapid 
advancement in our understanding of the brain, and the development of new 
treatments have sparked a need for research into a relatively new set of ethical 
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questions. These questions include ones for drugs as a use for enhancement in 
people suffering from medical conditions, healthy individuals, brain privacy, and 
the right of selfhood.  
 
When one asks the question of whether a new medical treatment should be 
allowed in practice, one would want to make a risk evaluation. What are the 
possible side-effects, what is the likelihood of the patients experiencing these 
side-effects, and what are the benefits and how likely is it that the treatment is 
successful? 
However, a risk evaluation in new medical procedures are rarely simple. First of 
all, the knowledge required to make such a risk evaluation may simply not be 
available. This is especially the case in neuroethics. Many new treatments 
involving the brain are put into use without much statistical basis for their 
effectiveness and risk. It is not that neuroscientists are more ready to take risks, 
or that they care less for the safety of the patients, but unlike most other 
medical treatments where decent animal analogs to the human biology can 
found, the human brain stands so different from animals that even though 
animal testing can be carried out and given an idea of the possible dangers, one 
cannot expect the testing to give a full answer on the effects on human 
cognition and consciousness (Glannon, Walter, 2000-78). This means that much 
of the empirical knowledge regarding the ratio between side-effects and 
benefits has to be gathered on human test subjects. These test subjects are 
typically patients who have not responded well to other treatments and whose 
quality of life is such that they are willing to take a greater risk. This is one of the 
fundamental issues in present neuroethics. On one hand it goes against the 
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principle of beneficence, on the other it seems a necessity if we want to improve 
our treatment of brain disorders. To what extend can patients be subjected to 
risk, in order to possibly find medical treatments that can help other patients? 
This however is a very general issue with the principle of beneficence, most 
medications have been shown to have possible adverse results, yet even 
considering these risks the possible gain is so significant that the principle of 
beneficence can be said to be achieved.  
 
 
Deep Brain Stimulation and ethical considerations: 
 
This chapter will discuss the ethical implications of Deep Brain Stimulation. On 
the 8 of November 2014 Etiks råd  Published a statement on the legalization of 1
deep brain stimulation. This statement weighs the pros and cons of such a 
procedure.  
One of the first issues mentioned in the statement is the issue of how safe deep 
brain stimulation is. The brain and nervous system is considered one of the most 
complex areas of human knowledge if not the most complex, and with this 
complexity the risk of unsuspected adverse effects is also increased(Det Etiske 
Råd, 2014-9). One such challenge success of the procedure is raised by the very 
nature of the brains basic functions. Not too long ago scientists and doctors 
would speak of areas of the brain being devoted to specific actions, but more 
and more this idea have proven to be if not incorrect then at least imprecise. 
1 Etisk råd is a Danish organisation of people with relevant qualifications to research difficult ethical 
questions. 
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Lately research has discovered that even though some areas of the brain is 
particularly important while performing specific tasks, these areas of the brain 
are not alone in being important whilst performing tasks. Further they are not 
alone relevant for performing one task but rather a large number of tasks. This is 
problematic for treatments such as DBS in that they stimulate an area of the 
brain relevant to the treatment of conditions such as OCD, Parkinson’s and 
depression. But while stimulating the necessary area for the treatment in the 
attempt to alleviate any of these illnesses, the treatment might also affect the 
patient in other ways. Two case studies where this issue became apparent is 
“The Happy OCD Patient” and a former sufferer of depression that turned happy 
but became overly impulsive.  
 
“The Happy OCD Patient” was a patient suffering from OCD who was treated 
with DBS, however, unfortunately the treatment had no effect on his OCD. He 
did however feel a lot happier after having the procedure done. This became an 
ethical dilemma to the doctors responsible for the procedure, should they keep 
the electrodes in his brain or remove them? In the end the doctors decided that 
since the goal of the procedure was to treat OCD not to create artificial 
happiness they would remove the electrodes from the patient (Constandi, 
Moheb, 2012). 
 
Another case was a man suffering from depression, who after being treated with 
DBS was alleviated of his depression but developed an unusual impulsivity, to an 
extent that led his wife to write to the doctors responsible for the treatment, 
asking that they lower the stimulation, stating he was easier to live with whilst 
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depressed. In this instance the doctors reasoned that as long the man was happy 
with the treatment they would not change anything (Constandi, Moheb, 
2012)(Maartje, Schermer, 2011). This example is particularly good as an analog 
to how changing the natural function of the brain is, with our present 
knowledge, far from an exact science. We do not presently understand in detail 
how DBS works, or where in the brain is the most effective place to stimulate for 
what. In fact, similar results have been achieved stimulating different areas of 
the brain. It should then be noted that it is far from uncommon that medications 
are used without a full understanding of how they work (Det Etiske Råd, 
Neuroetik, 2014-11).  
 
When is one to decide if a treatment should be used, there is almost always a 
risk assessment, and few medical procedures or medications come without any 
form of risk. Such risk assessments are not simple: one has to consider a number 
of questions. For example, what are the known risks of the treatment? How 
severe these risks are to the particular patient? Because one side effect might be 
a huge deal to one patient, but lesser or even insignificant to another. How likely 
is it that the patient will have negative experiences with the treatment? How 
serious are these side effects? How well is the long term effects of the 
treatment known? These are just some of the questions one has to ask.  
 
Another question is what the patient themselves think, and if the patient is 
capable of such an autonomous decision. Here, a procedure like DBS must be 
seen not as a single procedure but as a procedure that treats a number of 
different medical conditions. Unless the patient has no further issues that 
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question the patient’s ability to make decisions, there is no reason to question 
the patient’s autonomy. However, if the patient has severe depression one 
might argue that the patient is not in a healthy enough position to make an 
autonomous decision. It might be the case that they might require special 
treatment to ensure they are aware and understand the gains, and possible 
risks, of the treatment.  
 
Etisk råds’ statement raise the problem of identity, as mentioned earlier, the 
brain is a prerequisite to our cognition, senses, and consciousness. Therefore, it 
would follow that the brain would also be a prerequisite for our understanding 
of our self.  As a result, any change in our brain risks changing our understanding 
of who we are, which could lead to patient’s experiencing a loss of identity if the 
change happens dramatically (Glannon walter, 2000-75) (Karsten, Witt, et al., 
2011). One could then speculate if such an identity crisis could linger on even 
after the electrodes have been removed. 
 
 
The uncertainty of DBS: 
 
Since there is no or very little empirical evidence on the possibility of long term 
effects of DBS, one must not reject the possibility of irreversible risk and 
side-effects at later stages in the patient’s life. One way to achieve a more 
reliable statistical basis for DBS as a treatment would be to perform double blind 
tests. Double blind test are where a group of patients have the surgery 
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performed, but where only half of them had any actual stimulation, while at the 
same time, keeping those who conducted the study unaware of which patients 
had the actual treatment, and who had the placebo treatment. Though it could 
be challenging to perform double blind test, since that would require brain 
surgery on patients without the aim of treating an illness. One question to raise 
here is how much exactly can be contributed to placebo effect? Etisk råds 
statement follows that if such experiments are to be carried out, the patients 
that have only received placebo treatment should be offered the actual 
treatment afterwards (Det Etiske Råd, Neuroetik, comment by Videbech Poul 
2014) 
 
 
Etisk Råds Conclusion on Deep Brain Stimulation: 
 
Etisk Råd concludes that only in rare instances does DBS pose ethical questions 
that sets it apart from other treatments. They do however recommend that 
since DBS remains relatively unpredictable, it should, for the time being, be used 
with a certain precaution. This means that the procedure should be 
implemented slowly, in manner were the potential adverse effects can be 
studied without unnecessary risk for the patients. Etisk råd does however see 
good reason to use DBS on patients whose welfare is such that they need the 
treatment, but have responded poorly to other treatments. In short, DBS should 
so far only be used on patients as a last resort.  
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 Very few experiments have been carried out on depression. Only around 20 
patients in Germany, USA and Canada, of these 1/3 was cured, 1/3 showed 
improvement and 1/3 did not show any change. Etisk Råd recommends that DBS 
be not used as common practice in treating Depression before more clinical 
research have been carried out, on patients with chronic depression who have 
not responded to psychotherapy, antidepressant medications and ECT (Det 
Etiske Råd, Neuroetik, 2014).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Etisk råd accompanied their statement with 4 comments, one of these 
comments was written by Ph.D Student: Fatima Sabir. Sabir cautions that the 
results of DBS as a treatment could be a situation where even though the 
treatment was successful in the sense that it alleviated the symptoms of 
Parkinson’s, for example, it worsened the patient's welfare through side effects 
such as, depression, dementia, aggression. Sabir points to a paper by Jens 
Clausen on neuroethics in research and practise, stating that DBS could 
potentially increase the risk of suicide and depression by 25%.(Det Etiske Råd, 
Neuroetik, comment by Sabir, Fatima 2014) 
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“But information alone will unlikely change that DBS-treatments are reported to have an 
increased risk of suicide and depression with up to 25 percent of the patients” (Det 
Etiske Råd, Neuroetik, comment by Sabir, Fatima 2014) 
 
 
Upon further evaluation we have found that these figures are misrepresented, 
even if we go under the assumption of an unintentional grammatical error, her 
statement is still misleading to the facts (Clausen, Jens 2010, pg. 1153). The 
table at the top of page 17 shows the figures from Clausen’s article that Sabir is 
referencing in her comment. In this table we see the only figures that Sabir 
could be referencing from Clausen’s article regards to depression and suicide. 
When looking at the table we can see that suicide rates are reported to be from 
0.5-2%, not 25%, and depression itself is reported to be 1.5-25%, with 25% being 
the extreme. Not only is there a massive range between the depression figures, 
something that can be forgiven in some regards considering depression is a 
spectrum illness, but the reports of suicide vary as well. This does bring into 
question how reliable the figures are, and how they are to be interpreted. This is 
due to there being no mention of how the figures were gathered; whether they 
are from doctor’s reports, police reports, or someone’s gut feeling. Because of 
that we are dubious to take them for granted. The figures themselves are 
comprised from a sum of seven different studies, which in themselves are 
heavily focused upon Parkinson’s disease, which makes comparing or using 
them for DBS in use for psychiatric illnesses, for example, difficult due to the fact 
that as mentioned earlier in the essay, the DBS does not focus on the same area 
of the brain. A study published in 2010 comparing 27 patients having been 
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treated with DBS, to 31 patients with PD treated with optimal medical treatment 
did not find significant cognitive impairments other than an slight decrease in 
word fluency. However, reviewing the cases 1 year after surgery showed that 
15% treated with DBS showed severe cognitive decline (Clausen, Jens 2010, pg. 
1154). The complications and side-effects of DBS have in some instances shown 
to be severe, although not entirely uncommon, however, it does not follow that 
DBS is unethical. DBS may still be a valid treatment, and in some cases 
preferable to optimal medical treatments when optimal treatments such as 
medication and ablative surgery pose greater risk to the patients well-being. It is 
important when accessing the success or worth of a treatment to remember 
how you compare the figures. Figures such as an 17% presence of psychiatric 
side-effects might at first seem like a significant risk, and it is, but these figures 
should be compared to the other treatments available which show 13% risk of 
psychiatric side-effects. Which means when comparing the two, the difference is 
only 4% (Witt et al., 2008). 
 
 
Looking at the future potential uses for DBS, and looking at statements from 
Clausen, saying that “DBS is in many cases preferable” to ablative surgery or 
optimal medical treatment, it does not help when remarks from Sabir, even if 
they are unintentional, give undue negativity to a treatment that could 
potentially help people. It is our contention that the biggest  challenge for DBS is 
proving itself as effective, and whilst all new treatments must get through the 
initial stage of proving themselves, DBS has the additional challenge of 
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contending with, and attempting to dispel, the entrenched negativity caused by 
impetuous historical psychosurgery.  
 
The fear, or negative attitude towards neuroscience is not that abnormal, 
because of the impetuous history of psychosurgery, where patients were 
subjected to treatments such as lobotomy without much concern for their 
well-being. Horror stories of mind-control and the like have long been present in 
dystopian novels and in pop-culture. Examples of subtle emotional control, such 
as the patient who was treated for depression via the use of DBS, shows that 
very crude forms of “mind-control”, since his wife could theoretically be allowed 
to decide whether her husband should be more depressed or impulsive. With 
the constant improvement and development of treatments such as DBS, one 
could imagine a future where emotional “mind-control” would be a 
technological possibility (Giordano, James. 51 min-53 min). The question is then 
if these kind of fears are reason to discredit or abandon treatments such as DBS. 
 
The argument that because it is potentially feasible in the future for someone to 
control another’s emotions using DBS is a fallacious argument on the basis that 
it assumes a slippery slope. Not only that, but it takes the current figures of 
DBS--the ones that say DBS treatment can influence emotion--out of context, 
since the emotional reactions brought about via DBS treatment are often 
arbitrary or replicable in all cases, which is to say that a DBS treatment for 
Parkinson's does not necessarily elicit an emotion like rage, or complacency in 
every person, or even most. Because of that, it undermines the notion of 
“control”, since one cannot control what one has no control over. However, if 
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we were to assume that over the period of time there was a narrowing down of 
cause and effect to the point where people’s emotions could be controlled using 
DBS, it is not to say that it would even happen. Doctor’s nowadays are under 
extreme scrutiny to uphold the highest level of ethical values in regards to the 
well-being and autonomy of their patients. The burden of proof is on those who 
would claim that it would be used for mind control, as it is their claim that 
contends with the plethora of watchdogs and committees regulating treatment 
usage. Due to these challenges, we feel it is not likely that DBS would be used in 
an attempt to emotionally mind control people. 
 
Another major issue in Neuroethics is the case of informed consent. Patients 
needing psychiatric treatment do on some instances suffer illnesses that 
threatens the notion of their autonomy. This leads to a difficult ethical dilemma, 
whether or not the patient in such a case is the most qualified to speak of what 
options would be in their best interest. Furthermore, informed consent is 
threatened by the complexity of the brain’s function and the treatment used to 
better the sufferer’s medical condition. When looking at specific treatments 
such as DBS, informed consent is once again threatened by the fact that doctors 
do not in detail know how DBS works. This leads to the problem that the patient 
does not know in detail what procedure he is agreeing to. This inability to 
explain the reason why DBS work also leads to the question of how it is was 
known that DBS would work. The answer here is that the treatment has been 
tested, and mppw begins to show improvement in patients to a degree where it 
is thought of as an useful procedure. But one might then question the ethical 
basis for this conclusion, because at some point DBS would have been a 
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completely new and untested procedure. How was it in that case judged ethical, 
when the details of the procedure was not fully understood? The answer here 
most likely lie in the immediate condition of the patients who were offered the 
treatment. These patient have been patients whose quality of life would have 
been significantly reduced and whose optimal medical treatment at the time did 
not change this. This dilemma brings up an ethical quandary that doctors face on 
a day-to-day basis when treating people with impaired cognitive functions and 
knowledge with optimal medical treatment. So when considering the brain, is it 
a larger ethical dilemma with DBS when using a new type of DBS to treat an 
illness, especially when it has not been used in that capacity before? Animal 
testing provides its own ethical dilemmas in whether it is right, or at what stage 
it becomes right. Despite this not being something we have chosen not to 
address in this essay, there is still the recognisable question of how much animal 
testing is needed, assuming it is right, before we rule something as a ‘mature’ or 
‘ready’ treatment for a human. Considering there are no direct analogues 
between humans and other animals regarding the brain, it can be difficult to 
make this decision. If so, where do we draw the line between mature and 
premature human testing of DBS? 
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Conclusion: 
 
In the project we have addressed the history of psychosurgery, given examples 
of noninvasive treatments, and shown the progress in ablative brain surgery 
leading up to and setting the scene for Deep Brain Stimulation. We conclude 
that the historical background of psychosurgery has impacted the ethical climate 
now in regards to Deep Brain Stimulation. We foresee issues for Deep Brain 
Stimulation in the future, both in regards to the advancement of 
neurotechnology, and in regards to it overcoming the remaining stigma set by 
the past leading up to Deep Brain Stimulation. It has become clear that 
neuroethics, and in particular DBS is not without its ethical challenges. Yet it is 
also proven that the treatments is beneficial for patients with Parkinson’s, for 
example. In light of the present knowledge of DBS it seems to us that there is 
good reason to continue DBS on patients as a last resort, at least for the 
meantime. We feel that DBS should not yet be implemented at earlier stages, 
since the adverse side-effects and their likelihood is still not very well known. 
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